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As the editors observe at the start of this book, the law on succession is 
a “neglected field” in England whilst Continental and comparative lawyers 
have rediscovered it to be of immense practical importance which deserves 
greater academic attention. The rules of succession are of great significance 
to all; as pointed out by Penelope Reed in Chapter Seven there is no 
shortage of probate disputes that end up in the Chancery Division as a result 
of “… an ageing population, the increase in the incidence of dementia and 
the rise of house prices making estates worth fighting over…”  Since death 
is inevitable and everyone will die either testate, having made a valid will 
or intestate, without a valid will the law of succession affects us all. In order 
to address this gap in the law a conference took place in July 2015 at All 
Souls College Oxford attended by Chancery Judges, a member of the Court 
of Appeal as well as a number of leading academics and practitioners. This 
book comprises eleven of the conference papers. The result is an excellent 
book both as a reference work for students and practitioners and also of 
interest to the wider public who may be drawn in by the subject matter and 
possibly the picture on the loose leaf cover showing David Wilkie’s well-
known painting Reading of the Will. In many ways the most engaging 
feature of this collection is the breadth of subjects covered. They range from 
the more traditional succession issues such as the reform of the rules of 
intestacy in Chapter One and Mutual Wills in Chapter Five to the more 
challenging issues of Testamentary dispositions in favour of informal 
carers in Chapter Eight and Proprietary Estoppel in Chapter Four. Much 
credit should be given to the conference organisers and book editors for 
ensuring that the conference and later the book had sufficient breadth and 
did not dwell overly on the minutiae of the rules of drawing up a valid will 
although that said Chapter Four shows how this in itself embraces many 
wider legal issues. 
Curiously, the book starts with a chapter not about the rules that apply 
in drawing up a will but about the rules of intestacy when someone dies 
                                                 




without making a valid will. This has traditionally been a difficult issue. 
When a person dies intestate the law must step in and apply rules which 
reflect what the law deems to be the wishes of the deceased had he or she 
made a valid will or thought about it. The chapter is a comprehensive 
review of the development of the rules of intestacy. It manages to 
interweave some pertinent observations on the current state of the law with 
some proposals for how reform should proceed if recommendations from 
the Law Commission are adopted. It highlights the difficult position of 
cohabitants whose rights are so often forgotten in English law.  This chapter 
links well to Chapter Six where Birke Hacker one of the editors of the book 
reflects on how the law approaches the rectification and interpretation of a 
will. The quotation from Sir Horace Walpole made in the first paragraph1 
sums up a view taken by many in relation to the court’s ability to rectify a 
will. Walpole writes having heard that a recently deceased Royal Naval 
Officer Sir William Rowley had disinherited his son and grandson: 
 
… It is rather leaving an opportunity to the Chancery, to do the right 
thing, and set such an absurd will aside. Do not doubt it. The law 
makes no bones of wills. I have heard of a man who began his will 
thus: ‘This is my will, and I desire the Chancery will not make 
another for me’ Oh but it did …  
 
This is an excellent introduction highlighting the difficulty that the court 
has in attempting to rewrite what the testator had in mind when his 
intentions are not clear. To what extent should the law and the court play a 
role in deciding how one’s estate should be distributed? There is a link here 
with cases of intestacy where the law has to second guess who the deceased 
would have wanted to benefit when there is no valid will to indicate such 
wishes.  As Birke Hacker states “The problem is that we do not know what 
a testator in his innermost mind really wanted, and we have to establish his 
intentions as best we can from ‘his last will and testament’ he has left 
behind”.  Superficially in this case unlike intestacy the issue is one of 
interpretation of the will but the writer develops the wider issues such as 
whether the courts should interpret the will from accepted rules of 
interpretation of any document or from the point of view of the testator. 
Using examples from German Law she shows how the courts might come 
to a quite different conclusion according to the particular approach taken 
by a court.2 The German courts will always interpret the will from the point 
of view of the testator. So she explains where a testator leaves his ‘library’ 
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to a legatee3 and it can be shown that the testator often referred to his wine 
cellar as his ‘library’ then the bequest is of the wine not of the books. At 
the heart of this chapter is the recently decided United Kingdom case of 
Marley v Rawlings4 where a testator had made it clear that he wished his 
estate to pass to his wife and if she predeceased him then to the man that 
the couple called their son, but owing to an error in each of the wills of the 
parties this intention was no longer clear. Everyone concerned was fully 
aware of what the testator had intended but it took the eminently pragmatic 
approach of the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. The writer highlights 
the importance of this fairly simple case because it is one of the few cases 
to reach the highest judicial level. It also seeks to address the problem of 
whether extrinsic evidence is admissible when interpreting a will. Unlike 
other formal documents the courts have interpreted the Wills Act 1837 very 
strictly. The courts have always been reluctant to admit extrinsic evidence 
even when it may assist in the interpretation of the testator’s intentions.  
Linking well to the question of interpretation and rectification is the 
discussion on the mutual wills doctrine in Chapter Five. As highlighted by 
the author Ying Khai Liew the English courts have applied the doctrine of 
mutual wills since the eighteenth century5 but the precise definition of its 
operation, the legal principles involved and its underlying rationale remain 
difficult to define. The author suggested that he would propose a new way 
of understanding the mutual wills doctrine consistent with its orthodox 
principles in which to a large extent he succeeds.  This doctrine has always 
appeared to undermine the principle of testamentary freedom. As explained 
by the author in a typical mutual wills case two individuals come to an 
agreement that the first to die (A) will leave his property to the survivor (B) 
with B promising to leave whatever is left at her death to one or more 
ultimate beneficiaries C.6 This is dependent on the survivor B promising 
not to revoke her will after A’s death. The author challenges all existing 
explanations for upholding the mutual wills doctrine in particular the view 
that B’s obligation is ‘floating’ or suspended during B’s lifetime and offers 
a range of alternative explanations. To some extent his conclusion is a new 
understanding but it is a compromise relying on two distinct analyses 
arising from different facts and he concludes that perhaps many of the 
problems arise from an attempt to apply the same explanation to both sets 
of facts. The cases fall into those where B receives property from A to be 
held for C and those cases where B promises that property owned by B 
absolutely will be held for C. His analysis shows that in the first case a 
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constructive trusts arises making B trustee for A but in the second case a 
constructive trust arises compensating A who has relied on B’s promise.  
The modern challenges to testamentary freedom are also examined by 
Rebecca Probert in Chapter Two “Disquieting Thoughts: Who will benefit 
when we are gone?” This chapter explores the ability of individuals to 
challenge the disposition of an estate. In a wide ranging and fascinating 
review of the ability of challenges made to the disposition of an estate over 
the past eighty years, she maps the introduction of legislation giving such 
rights of challenge. Setting this in the context of Victorian and early 
twentieth century wills when almost complete freedom of disposition 
existed she illustrates the difficulties that such freedom created often using 
examples from literature. She reviews the changes in the law from the 1938 
Act7 to the most recent amendments made by the Inheritance and Trustees’ 
Powers Act 2014 and concludes with an analysis of the most recent 
changes.  However this analysis goes much further than merely 
commenting on the changes she manages in this short section to evaluate 
the whole basis of the right to make a claim for financial provision with a 
wealth of views from a range of academics. Her conclusion highlights the 
incongruity of allowing a claim for financial provision on the death of a 
relative which in life could not have been sustained. Using a number of very 
recent cases she shows how finely divided the courts have been in the past 
as to how such legislation has been applied and she rightly questions why 
one type of choice is seen as trumping the other in particular why should 
the express words in the will not have priority? 
In a collection as wide ranging as this it is impossible to consider in full 
all the different aspects of the law on succession but the review of 
proprietary estoppel in Chapter Four by Ben MacFarlane is particularly 
noteworthy. This chapter examines the claim that in upholding the doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel the settled aspects of the law of succession are 
undermined. He quickly challenges such a view stating the well-known 
view that proprietary estoppel prevents parties from unconscionability by 
exploiting strict legal rules.  His short succinct chapter succeeds in 
explaining the justification for allowing proprietary estoppel to take 
precedence over provisions in a will. Starting with one of the more 
problematic cases Suggitt v Suggitt8 he shows the difficulties in applying 
the doctrine. Here a father had specifically excluded his son from his will 
but the son brought to the court evidence of promises made during the 
father’s lifetime that he would inherit the farm and he had positioned his 
entire life on this promise. The difficulty here was that the court was 
upholding and giving legal effect to an informal non-contractual promise 
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above a validly executed will. He poses the important conceptual question 
as to whether proprietary estoppel is sufficiently distinct in its requirements 
and operation from contract law. His analysis shows that such promises can 
be upheld in spite of their informality and rather than basing their validity 
in contract law such rules are based in equity and are upheld in order to 
prevent injustice. One issue that could have been developed further is the 
question of the extent of the property that the claimant can claim. Where 
the estate has increased in size since the promise was made it is unclear as 
to whether and on what basis the claimant can claim the increased estate. 
The chapter ends with some final thoughts where he reflects on the role of 
proprietary estoppel concluding that it cannot be invoked simply because 
there is a failing in the strict rules of contract law or succession but rather 
it should be limited to mitigating the severity of the strict rules of contract, 
succession and property law. The overlap between the law of succession 
and proprietary estoppel has long troubled lawyers and this chapter makes 
a strong case that proprietary estoppel does not undermine the law of 
succession. 
Perhaps the most controversial chapter in the book is Chapter Eight 
which considers grounds for the reversal of gifts to informal carers. Set in 
the context of the enormous increase in the need for social care and the 
inability of formal provision to meet this need, Brian Sloan shows how 
important informal social care has become in society; figures from the 
Office for National Statistics show that there are 5.8 million informal carers 
in England and Wales. He points out that many suffer financial and health 
disadvantages as a result of their responsibilities and it is quite likely that 
recipients of such care may recognise the carer in their will either from 
gratitude or moral obligation. The focus of his discussion is on challenges 
made to a will based on undue influence. This is a difficult area of law 
because the dependency that may arise where a person is in poor health and 
reliant on others for day to day living sets the scene for opportunities for 
undue influence to take place. He summarises the difficulties in 
distinguishing between persuasion and genuine undue influence. Although 
there have been many recent cases involving carers where claimants cite 
undue influence the modern judiciary frequently revert to nineteenth 
century guidance from Sir JP Wilde in Hall v Hall.9 Wilde had concluded 
in that case that:  
 
…Importunity or threats, such as the testator has not had the 
courage to resist, moral command asserted and yielded to for the 
sake of peace and quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or 
social discomfort … if carried to a degree in which the free play of 
                                                 




the testator’s mind, discretion or wishes, is overborne, will 
constitute undue influence.   
 
By comparison, Wilde held that “…other behaviour such as persuasion, 
appeals to the affection or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude for 
past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like … are all 
legitimate…” Sloan describes the difficulties that the courts have faced in 
recent cases in distinguishing what constitutes a “sentiment of gratitude for 
past services or pity for future destitution” and what “constitutes behaviour 
that interferes with the free play of the testator’s mind”. He shows that 
evidence brought to court of independence of mind will defeat a claim of 
undue influence as in Parker v Litchfield 10  where the will of an 
independently minded grandmother was upheld in spite of a claim of undue 
influence by her granddaughter. Where a testator is shown to be in poor 
health or of weak disposition the court will consider the facts in a different 
light. So in Schrader v Schrader11 a judge set aside the will of a mother 
leaving her house entirely to one of her sons who had become her carer 
because there was evidence that the mother was a vulnerable lady in her 
mid-nineties and there was cumulative evidence that the son had exerted 
behaviour likely to influence his mother. The issue is often one of evidence 
and burden of proof. Should the court presume undue influence in cases 
involving carers? He concludes that in the current social context the courts 
should not set aside testamentary gifts to informal carers lightly and it is 
important not to apply the same principles as those used in inter vivos 
dispositions where a presumption of undue influence may apply. 
This is a most interesting collection of essays. It highlights an area of 
law which has suffered neglect in recent years and yet as many of these 
essays show these are very topical and complex issues which need to be 
addressed today both from an individual’s point of view and also as a matter 
of policy. 
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